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I. INTRODUCTION
Assessments of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care
Act)1 echo a common theme: the legislation does much to provide health care coverage
for the uninsured, but it does far less to contain health care spending. According to
projections by the Congressional Budget Office, the Affordable Care Act will ensure that
94% of Americans are insured by 2019.2 On the other hand, the inflation rate for health
care costs will change very little. Instead of increasing by 6.8% per year between 2015
and 2019 without the Affordable Care Act, health care costs are expected to increase by
6.7% per year during the same time period under the Act. 3
To be sure, the emphasis on increasing access over cutting costs is not unique to the
Affordable Care Act. President Lyndon Baines Johnson and Congress employed the same
*Visiting Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; Samuel R. Rosen Professor and Co-Director,
Hall Center for Law and Health, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. Professor Orentlicher holds an
MD and a JD, Harvard University.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. I11-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010);
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
2. Letter from Congressional Budget Office to Nancy Pelosi Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives (Mar. 20, 2010), available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ll3xx/docll379/AmendReconProp.pdf.
[hereinafter Congressional Budget Office letter]. This calculation applies to U.S. citizens under the age of 65
(with those 65 or older eligible for Medicare). Id.
3. Andrea M. Sisko et al., National Health Spending Projections: The Estimated Impact of Reform
Through 2019, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1933, 1936 (2010).
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strategy when they enacted Medicare in 1965,4 and Massachusetts followed suit when it
passed its health care reform in 2006.5 As a political matter, it is much easier to provide
new entitlements than to curtail benefits.
The option of kicking the cost problem down the road cannot continue indefinitely,
and policy experts have given much thought to options for containing health care
spending. 6 As I will argue in this Article, a key element of leading proposals for cost
containment is morally important but socially infeasible. Specifically, scholars
regularly-and rightly-recommend a public, transparent process for deciding when
health care will not be covered by public or private insurance. 7 If people will be denied
medical tests or treatments that might preserve their life or maintain their health, we
ought to ensure that all members of society have a voice in the decision making process.
However, while broad public participation serves important principles of justice, it
also breeds intolerable public conflict.8 When Americans try to make choices about
access to life-preserving medical care, public, transparent processes fail. 9 Either those
using the process never make the difficult choices that are needed, the difficult decisions
that are made unravel and are abandoned, or the decision making process itself is
discarded.10 This is the lesson of Medicare funding for dialysis,'1 the Oregon Health
Plan, 12 managed care, 13 certificate of need legislation, 14 the effort in 2009 to revise
guidelines for breast cancer screening, 15 and the National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, we need to identify alternative
strategies for cost-containment that can succeed and that can satisfy, as nearly as
possible, the principles of justice. In other words, we need to pay greater attention to
social constraints on rationing in deciding which rationing policies to adopt.
4. David Blumenthal & James Morone, The Lessons of Success-Revisiting the Medicare Story, 359
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2384, 2385 (2008).
5. Jon Kingsdale, Implementing Health Care Reform in Massachusetts, Strategic Lessons Learned, 28
HEALTH AFF. w588, w588 (2009).
6. See generally Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, THE NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 36
(examining the inordinately high cost of healthcare in McAllen, Texas); Jonathan Oberlander & Joseph White,
Systemwide Cost Control-The Missing Link in Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1131 (2009)
(explaining the shortcomings in some proposals for controlling healthcare costs); David Orentlicher, Paying
Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155 (1996) (exploring the
use and misuse of financial incentives in regards to controlling healthcare costs).
7. See infra Part IV (discussing the various recommendations for public, transparent processes to contain
the high cost of health care).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 52-55 (discussing why public transparent processes breed
intolerable public conflict).
9. This is not a purely American phenomenon, nor is it a phenomenon limited to health care services. It is
a problem with any decisions that have life or death implications, and it is a problem for other societies as well,
though often to a lesser extent than in the United States. As discussed, infra, text accompanying notes 93-95,
the UK also has struggled with its public, transparent process for denying access to expensive medical
treatments.
10. See infra Part V (describing past failures of public, transparent processes).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See infra Part V (illustrating the failure of public, transparent processes in a proposed revision of
breast cancer screening guidelines in 2009).
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II. THE HEALTH CARE COST PROBLEM
Inexorably increasing spending on health care has captured the attention of policy
experts and policy makers for decades. 16 Sharply rising health care costs led Congress to
promote managed care via the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973,17 and
President Jimmy Carter made cost containment the center of his unsuccessful efforts to
reform the U.S. health care system in the late 1970s.18 Managed care appeared to make
important inroads into health care cost inflation during the 1990s, when health insurance
premiums experienced annual increases as low as 0.8%.19 Public rejection of managed
care's cost-saving strategies, however, was followed by the more typical pattern of
substantial premium increases, with double-digit percentage increases by 2001.20
Health care spending.now consumes more than 17% of U.S. GDP and is expected to
account for more than 19% of GDP by 2019.21 As health care costs have risen, so has the
number of uninsured Americans. More and more businesses find health care benefits
unaffordable, and more and more individuals cannot cover the cost of a health care
insurance policy on their own.2 2 Since 1978, the number of uninsured has more than
doubled, and roughly 50 million people now lack health care coverage. 23
The high costs of health care make it unaffordable for too many people. The U.S.
also wastes too many dollars on care that is unnecessary or on care whose benefits cannot
be justified in terms of its costs.24 At the same time that many people receive insufficient
care, others receive too much care.25 Unnecessary or unjustified care has important
health consequences in addition to its fiscal consequences. Any medical test or treatment
care can cause harm as well as benefit, and many patients realize more harm than good
from their health care services. 26
16. John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System-Managed Care, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 742,
744 (1992).
17. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
300e (2006)).
18. Robert Finbow, Presidential Leadership or Structural Constraints? The Failure of President Carter's
Health Insurance Proposals, 28 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 169, 172-73 (1998); National Health Insurance-A
Brief History of Reform Efforts in the US., KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 2009),
www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7871.pdf.
19. Trends in Health Care Costs and Spending, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 2007),
www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7692.pdf.
20. Id
21. National Health Expenditure Projections 2009-2019, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERV.,
(Sept. 2010), www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/NHEProjections2009to2Ol9.pdf.
22. The Uninsured: A Primer, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 8-9 (Dec. 2010),
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-06_Data Tables.pdf.
23. Robin A. Cohen et al., Health Insurance Coverage Trends, 1959-2007: Estimates from the National
Health Interview Survey, NAT'L HEALTH STAT. REP., at 5 (July 1, 2009), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr017.pdf (showing that fewer than 25 million Americans lacked health
care insurance in 1978); Carmen De Navas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the
United States: 2009 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, at 22 (Sept. 2010) available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf (reporting that 50.7 million Americans were uninsured in 2009).
24. David B. Evans et al., Comparative Efficiency of National Health Systems, 323 BMJ 307, 309 (2001).
25. Clark Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 77-
82 (2002).
26. Chunliu Zhan & Marlene R. Miller, Excess Length of Stay, Charges, and Mortality Attributable to
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The inefficiency of the U.S. health care system is reflected in international
comparisons of national health care systems. While we spend far more than other
countries, we fare poorly in terms of life expectancy, infant mortality, and other
indicators of health status.27 In one study, researchers measured both the actual health
attainment of a nation and the potential health attainment that could be achieved based on
the amount of the nation's health care spending. 2 8 The U.S. ranked below a large number
of other countries, including Spain, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, United Kingdom,
Denmark, Norway, Japan, China, Australia, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, and
Venezuela. 29
III. INADEQUATE STEPS TO CONTAIN COSTS IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
While Obama administration officials promised to "bend the cost curve" 30 in their
health care reform efforts, it is unlikely that the Affordable Care Act will have a
meaningful effect on costs. Indeed, as mentioned, the Congressional Budget Office
projects only a minimal reduction of health care cost inflation from the Act. 31 The
Affordable Care Act's most important cost-savings provisions involve reductions in
Medicare reimbursement rates. More than $200 billion will be saved by reducing fees
paid to hospitals, nursing homes, and other health care facilities. 32 Another $145 billion
will be saved by eliminating excessive payments to private health care plans that serve
Medicare recipients under the Medicare Advantage program. 3 3
For the most part, however, the Act's cost-saving measures do not address the
fundamental drivers of health care cost inflation. Our health care system is characterized
by too much care at too high prices. 3 4 These excesses in turn reflect a system in which
Medical Injuries During Hospitalization, 290 JAMA 1868, 1871-72 (2003).
27. Life Expectancy at Birth, Total Population, OECD (Nov. 25, 2010), www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-
issues-migration-health/life-expectancy-at-birth-total-population 20758480-table8; Infant Mortality: Deaths
per 1,000 Live Births, OECD (2010), www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/infant-
mortality_20758480-table9.
28. Evans et al., supra note 24, at 307.
29. Id. at 309.
30. Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform and Cost Control, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED.
601, 602 (2010).
31. See Sisko, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
32. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3401, 124 Stat. 119, 480 (2010);
Memorandum from the Dep't of Health & Human Servs. to Cong. (Apr. 22, 2010), available at
www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA 2010-04-22.pdf The Congressional Budget Office has
also calculated estimates for the fiscal impact of the Affordable Care Act. See Congressional Budget Office
letter supra note 2 (explaining the projections of the Congressional Budget Office). There are differences
between the two sets of estimates. Part of the differences reflects the fact that the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services estimates look at the impact on total expenditures on health care in the United States, while
the Budget Office estimates look at the impact on the federal budget. Mark Campbell, Making Sense of CMS'
Actuarial Report on the Impact of Health Care Reform, National Association of Public Hospitals and Health
Systems, NAT'L Assoc. OF PUB. Hosp. AND HEALTH SYs. (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.naph.org/Main-Menu-
Category/Newsroom/Safety-Net-Matters-Blog/Making-sense-of-CMS-Actuarial-Report-on-the-Impact-of-
Health-Reform.aspx.
33. Affordable Care Act §3201.
34. David Orentlicher, Cost Containment and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 7 FLA.
INT'L U. LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2011).
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the buyers of health care have too little negotiating leverage, the sellers of care have too
much leverage, and the providers of care earn their income in terms of the quantity rather
than the quality of care they deliver.35 In other countries, for example, a government
single payer for health care (the buyer) can bargain more effectively with physicians,
hospitals, and pharmaceutical companies than can the many private insurance companies
in the United States.36 At the same time, hospital mergers have given sellers of health
care in the United States greater leverage than their counterparts in other countries.3 7
These cost pressures are further aggravated by a fee-for-service reimbursement system
that generally rewards physicians and hospitals for providing more care, 38 whether or not
they provide better care. When it comes to these structural reasons for the high cost of
health care in the U.S., the Affordable Care Act is silent or relies on pilot programs that
would need much broader implementation in the future to solve the health care cost
problem.
IV. PUBLIC, TRANSPARENT PROCESSES TO CONTAIN COSTS
If the Affordable Care Act comes up short in the cost containment effort, which
alternatives should be pursued in the future? As this Part discusses, many leading
scholars urge the use of an independent, public commission that would assume
responsibility for deciding how to ration our limited health care dollars. While a statute
can specify in a general way the kinds of health care services that should be covered, it is
not possible for legislators to draw precise lines between covered and uncovered services.
We want to fund surgery to replace damaged heart valves, but should the surgery be
offered to patients with advanced dementia or metastatic cancer? How long and with
what quality should a person's life expectancy be to receive a new liver, kidney dialysis,
or treatment for prostate cancer? In the view of many scholars, it may not be possible for
legislation to provide clear lines between covered and uncovered care, but we can entrust
the drawing of lines to a public entity that has the right kinds of decision makers and the
appropriate decision making process to make the decisions necessary to ration our health
care dollars fairly and wisely.
For example, Yale health policy professor Jennifer Prah Ruger has proposed a
model of shared health governance that combines scientific expertise with an open,
deliberative process in which consumers, physicians, health care institutions, and public
35. Chris L. Peterson & Rachel Burton, US. Health Care Spending: Comparison with Other OECD
Countries, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Sept. 17, 2007),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1316&context-key workplace&seiredir-l#se
arch=Chris+L.+Peterson+&+Rachel+Burton,+U.S.+Health+Care+Spending:+Comparison+with+OtherOECD
+Countries. Higher U.S. health care costs may also reflect the fact that labor costs generally are higher in the
U.S. than in other countries and that health care is a labor-intensive industry. Paul H. Rubin & Kaz Miyagiwa,
Why Is Medical Care Expensive in the US. 17 (Mar. 5, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1778305. Still, we can detect inefficiencies in the U.S. health care
system by comparing high-cost communities with low-cost communities. Orentlicher, supra note 34.
36. Gerard Anderson et al., It's The Prices, Stupid: Why The United States Is So Different From Other
Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 102 (2003).
37. Peterson & Burton, supra note 35, at 42.
38. Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 158.
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officials participate. 39 Under the shared governance paradigm, medical evidence and
community values together would shape the package of health care services guaranteed to
all persons-with people being free to purchase additional services with their own
funds.4 0
Similarly, Michigan State philosophy professor Leonard Fleck has proposed an
"informed democratic consensus model" to make health care allocation decisions in a
public, deliberative process. 4 1 In Fleck's model, allocation decisions would be made by
local health councils and a national health congress that would be created with lay
membership to fashion rationing guidelines on the basis of expert advice and critical
moral reflection. 42
In his program for reform, former Senator Tom Daschle proposed the creation of a
"Federal Health Board" (Board) that would be modeled on the Federal Reserve. 43 The
Board would be composed of experts in health care and economics and would be
appointed by the president for ten-year terms. 44 In addition to oversight over many other
aspects of the health care system's structure, the Board would "promote 'high-value'
medical care" by recommending coverage of drugs and procedures that are backed by
solid evidence.4 5 The Board would "make its decisions in public meetings, with
mandatory reports to Congress."4 6 The Board's recommendations would be binding on
all federal health programs, and they likely would be influential for private insurance
plans, much as Medicare coverage decisions currently influence private insurers.47
The Affordable Care Act took an initial step toward a health care allocation
commission when it created the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute
(Institute). 48 The Institute will promote "comparative-effectiveness" research-research
that compares the benefits and risks of different medical treatments-so physicians will
have better data on the value of treatment alternatives when making choices for their
patients. 4 9 The Institute also will analyze comparative-effectiveness data and issue public
reports with its analyses. 50 While the Institute is prohibited from making coverage
recommendations, Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurers may take the Institute's
analyses into account when making their own coverage decisions. 5 1
The different models I have described differ in the make-up of the decision makers.
Daschle and the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute rely on professional
experts, Ruger on a broad mix of patients, health care providers and other stakeholders,
and Fleck on lay citizens. But all provide for a public, transparent process.
39. JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 172-83 (2010).
40. Id.
41. Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic Decisionmaking Approach, 140 U. PA.
L. REv. 1597, 1617 (1992).
42. Id. at 1617-27.
43. ToM DASCHLE, CRITICAL: WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT THE HEALTH-CARE CRISIS 169-72 (2008).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 172.
47. Id. at 179.
48. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6301, 124 Stat. 119, 727 (2010).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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While public, transparent processes to contain health care costs are well-justified by
moral principle, they are difficult to employ when making the kinds of life-and-death
decisions that rationing requires.52 As Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt observed in
Tragic Choices, public, transparent processes can provoke intolerable social conflict.53
When Americans have to choose who does and does not have access to health care, some
important social values will be served but others may be sacrificed. 54 If we provide
treatment to the patients who can live the longest with care, we often will neglect the
patients who have the greatest need for care (since the more advanced a patient's disease,
the less amenable it is to treatment). Conversely, if we favor patients with the greatest
need, we neglect patients who will live the longest. Because of the inevitable clash of key
values, societies often look for ways to disguise their rationing choices; otherwise, public
discomfort will bring the rationing process down. 55
V. PAST FAILURES OF PUBLIC, TRANSPARENT PROCESSES
Public, transparent processes not only are predicted to fail by the Tragic Choices
analysis, they in fact have generally failed. Important examples include the rationing of
kidney dialysis, the Oregon Health Plan, certificate of need legislation, managed care,
breast cancer screening guidelines and the UK's National Institute of Health and Clinical
Excellence.
When long-term kidney dialysis became available in the 1960s, there were not
enough machines to treat everyone with kidney failure, and hospitals created committees
to decide which patients would receive dialysis. 56 Committee members considered the
age and medical suitability of patients; they also considered educational background and
economic status.57 Often, people were chosen because of their perceived social worth
rather than on account of more equitable criteria.58 As one committee member observed,
"I remember voting against a young woman who was a known prostitute. I found I
couldn't vote for her, rather than another candidate, a young wife and mother . . . ."59
Because of the controversy over the decisions, Congress authorized Medicare funding in
1972 for anyone who required dialysis, and the rationing committees were no longer
needed. 60
In the 1990s, Oregon decided to change the way it operated its Medicaid program. 61
Instead of providing broad health care benefits to a limited number of the poor, it would
provide basic benefits to all of the poor (defined as anyone with a family income less than
52. GUIDO CALABREsI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 18-28 (1978).
5 3. Id.
54. Id.
5 5. Id.
56. Roger W. Evans et al., Implications for Health Policy: A Social and Demographic Profile of
Hemodialysis Patients in the United States, 245 JAMA 487, 487 (1981).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. RENtE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL: A SOCIAL VIEW OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS AND DIALYSIS 246 (1974).
60. Evans et al., supra note 56, at 487.
61. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Heath Care Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 491, 501-05 (1995).
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the federal poverty level of income). 62 Government officials toured the state, held town
hall meetings and received wide public input. 63 They then developed a list of more than
700 pairs of medical conditions and their treatments which they ranked in terms of their
benefits and costs.M After receiving public comments, government officials reordered the
ranking, and they made additional revisions when the federal government raised concerns
about the impact of the ranking on persons with disabilities. 65 Once the list was finalized
and the state legislature decided on the amount of Medicaid funding for the new budget,
the state decided how far down the list it could go in providing coverage. 66 For
subsequent budget cycles, state officials updated the list and re-determined how far down
the list they could provide coverage. 67
In a few important ways, the Oregon Health Plan did not meet its goals. First, while
the coverage was supposed to provide only a basic benefits package, it provided more
generous coverage than typical private insurance plans in Oregon. For example, the
Oregon Health Plan provided better coverage for mental health services, treatment of
HIV infection, and organ transplantation. 68 In other words, Oregon did not really cut
back on the kinds of health care services it would cover. Instead, it expanded its funding
for health care coverage for the poor, through both an increase in the cigarette tax and a
larger appropriation from general revenues. 69 To the extent that Oregon did reduce costs,
it did so by increasing its reliance on managed care for patients in the Health Plan. 70 In
addition, Oregon ended up increasing its Medicaid spending faster than other states, and
the economic downturn in the early 2000s resulted in a cutback in coverage to the point
that Oregon's uninsured population rose back to pre-Health Plan levels within a decade
of the Plan's implementation. 7 1
Certificate-of-need legislation held considerable promise as a rationing strategy, and
to an important extent it was designed to avoid the case-by-case rationing judgments that
are so difficult to make in a public fashion. As Calabresi and Bobbitt observe, "first-
order" rationing decisions, which decide how much of a particular resource will be
available, are less exposed and therefore less controversial than "second-order" rationing
decisions, which decide how the rationed resource will be allocated among the people
who would benefit from access. 72 Certificate-of-need policies look more like first-order
than second-order rationing policies. Under certificate-of-need legislation, hospitals need
62. Id. at 502.
63. Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter, Rationing Care in Oregon: The New Accountability, 10
HEALTH AFF. 7,20 (1991).
64. Peters, supra note 61, at 503.
65. Id. at 502-05.
66. Somnath Saha et al., Giving Teeth to Comparative-Effectiveness Research-The Oregon Experience,
362 NEW ENG. J. MED. el8(l), el8(2) (2010).
67. Id.
68. Lawrence Jacobs et al., The Oregon Health Plan and the Political Paradox of Rationing: What
Advocates and Critics Have Claimed and What Oregon Did, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 161, 166-67
(1999).
69. Id at 165-66.
70. Id
71. Id.; Thomas Bodenheimer, The Oregon Health Plan-Lessons for the Nation (First of Two Parts), 337
NEW ENG. J. MED. 651, 652 (1997); Jonathan Oberlander, Health Reform Interrupted: The Unraveling of the
Oregon Health Plan, 26 HEALTH AFF. w96, w99 (2007).
72. CALABREsI & BOBBrrr, supra note 52, at 19,40.
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permission from a state agency before they can expand or build a new facility. 73 The
state agencies are supposed to deny permission when there is no medical need for more
hospital beds. 74 Thus, the state agency makes the first-order determination about the
number of hospital beds, but not the second order determination about which patients will
have access to the beds. The certificate-of-need approach could automatically ratchet
down the provision of expensive medical services simply because physicians would
recognize that the availability of hospital beds had diminished. Rather than having
committees decide who would have access to hospital care, physicians would adjust their
standards for recommending hospitalization, and health care spending would decrease.
Thus, for example, people are less likely to be admitted for hospital care in communities
with fewer hospital beds per capita. And even with the lower rates of hospitalization,
patients are no more likely to die in the communities with fewer beds. 75
In a health care system like that in the United States, where many communities have
surplus hospital beds, certificate-of-need legislation could have a big impact, by reducing
unnecessary hospitalizations, and it has in some places for some time. 76 However,
certificate-of-need legislation has not been successful overall.77 While a number of
reasons underlie the failure of the approach, much of the failure likely reflects the public
nature of the process for approving or rejecting applications. If a hospital wants to build a
new facility or expand an existing one, residents of the local community can mobilize on
behalf of the proposal. Thus, for example, when a community hospital in Irvington, NJ
wanted to expand, a court instructed the state agency to consider not only the number of
hospital beds in the area, but also the proximity of the beds to local residents, even
though the hospital was only 3.5 miles from a university hospital in Newark, NJ. 7
In other words, a certificate-of-need policy has elements of second-order as well as
first-order rationing decisions. When the state agency decides the overall number of beds
for the state or region in the state, it makes a first-order rationing decision. When it
decides which hospitals will get to operate the beds, it makes a rationing decision that lies
between the first-order decision about number of beds and the second-order decision as to
who uses the beds. To the extent that the decisions have second-order elements, it
becomes more difficult to make them. And even though first-order rationing decisions
may be less controversial than second-order decisions, they too can provoke significant
controversy. When Congress decides to cut the Medicare budget, for example, it
encounters resistance from Medicare beneficiaries. 79
73. Certificate of need policies also apply to nursing homes and other health care facilities, and they can
require permission not only for capital construction but also for acquiring new equipment. MARK HALL ET AL.,
HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHIcs, 1205, 1208 (7th ed. 2007).
74. Statewide Health Coordinating Council v. Gen. Hosp. of Humana, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 906, 908-09 (Ark.
1983).
75. Elliott S. Fisher et al., Associations Among Hospital Capacity, Utilization, and Mortality of U.S.
Medicare Beneficiaries, Controlling for Sociodemographic Factors, 34 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1351, 1356 (2000).
76. David Leonhardt, Health Cuts with Little Effect on Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at Bl.
77. HALL ET AL., supra note 73, at 1208.
78. Irvington Gen. Hosp. v. Dep't of Health, 374 A.2d 49, 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
79. Seniors have consistently been more likely than younger adults to have an unfavorable opinion of the
Affordable Care Act, and their opposition likely reflects the fact that much of the expansion in coverage under
the Act will be funded by reductions in Medicare reimbursement. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll, KAISER FAM.
FOUND., 5 (Feb. 2011), www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8156-F.pdf.
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The rise and fall of managed care in the United States also demonstrates the Tragic
Choices phenomenon. Health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other managed
care plans promised that patients would receive all medically necessary or appropriate
care-the same pledge that patients receive from fee-for-service plans. The plans also
promised that they would deliver care in a more cost-effective fashion.8 0 However, as
patients began to understand that managed care entailed limits on days of hospitalization,
restrictions on patient access to physician specialists, and other rationing techniques,
public support for managed care dissipated.8 1 Managed care plans responded by
changing their rules, and they have come to look more like traditional fee-for-service
plans. 82
A recent example of the failure of public, transparent processes was provided by a
proposed revision of breast cancer screening guidelines in 2009. The U.S. Preventive
Services Task Force (Task Force) is a panel of independent medical experts that regularly
develops recommendations regarding the provision of preventive medical services. The
Task Force is appointed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality at the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services.83 In November 2009, the Task Force
concluded that women with a normal risk for breast cancer should receive routine
mammograms to screen for cancer beginning at age 50 instead of age 40. An immediate
public backlash led the White House and the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services to repudiate the new guidelines within days of their release. 84
Treatment of breast cancer provides another illustration of how difficult it is to
ration health care publicly. During the late 1980s and 1990s, many physicians thought
metastatic breast cancer could be treated with very high doses of chemotherapy followed
by "autologous" bone marrow transplantation. 85 With this therapy, doctors would remove
stem cells from the bone marrow of the patient for later use in transplantation and then
administer very high doses of chemotherapy to more effectively eliminate the cancer
cells. 8 6 Ordinarily, doctors cannot use such high doses to treat breast cancer because they
also kill the patient's bone marrow stem cells. 87 However, since the chemotherapy can be
followed by infusing the woman's previously removed stem cells, the higher doses can be
used.8 8 Physicians who provided high dose chemotherapy followed by bone marrow
80. David Orentlicher, The Rise and Fall of Managed Care: A Predictable "Tragic Choices"
Phenomenon, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 411, 418-19 (2003).
81. Id. at 419.
8 2. Id.
83. US. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF), AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND
QuALITY, www.ahrq.gov/clinic/uspstfix.htm (last visited May 10, 2011).
84. Kevin Sack & Gina Kolata, Breast Cancer Screening Policy Won't Change, U.S. Officials Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at Al.
85. Edward A. Stadtmauer et al., Conventional-Dose Chemotherapy Compared with High-Dose
Chemotherapy Plus Autologous Hematopoietic Stem-Cell Transplantation for Metastatic Breast Cancer, 342
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1069, 1069 (2000). With autologous transplants, the same person serves as both donor and
recipient of the transplant. Hollie Devine et al., Mobilization ofHematopoietic Stem Cells for Use in Autologous
Transplantation, 144 CLINICAL J. OF ONCOLOGY NURSING 212, 212 (2010)
86. James 0. Armitage, The History of Autologous Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation, in THOMAS'
HEMATOPOIETIC CELL TRANSPLANTATION: STEM CELL TRANSPLANTATION 8, 8 (Frederick R. Appelbaum et al.
eds., 4th ed. 2004).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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transplantation thought they could successfully treat metastatic breast cancer that way. 89
Many insurance companies initially refused to pay for the treatment, on the ground that
their policies excluded coverage for experimental treatments. 90 Even though the
companies were correctly interpreting their policies, the media harshly criticized them,
and courts often forced them to provide coverage. 9 1 Ultimately, studies found that the
therapy was not an effective way to treat breast cancer. 92
The United Kingdom created its version of an independent health-care allocation
agency in 1999 in the form of the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE). For nearly a decade, NICE had authority to decide whether drugs and other
treatments were sufficiently cost-effective that the National Health Service would cover
them.9 3 NICE operates much like an administrative agency or independent commission
in the United States government, consulting with and inviting comments from patients
and other stakeholders. NICE's guidelines are (a) developed by independent panels of
experts in health care and economics, (b) finalized by national collaborating centers of
representatives from academic medicine, professional associations and patient
organizations, and (c) formally approved by the Institute. 94 But NICE's decisions to
exclude coverage for new cancer drugs and other treatments provoked controversy, and
in October 2010, the UK government announced its intention to revoke the Institute's
authority to make coverage decisions. 95
Finally, consider the furor over the "death panels" provision in the Affordable Care
Act. 96 According to critics, the provision would have empowered doctors to ration
medical care by discontinuing treatment of terminally ill patients and thereby hastening
the patients' deaths. 97 In fact, the provision merely would have authorized reimbursement
for the time doctors spent counseling their patients who wanted to write advance
directives or otherwise engage in planning about medical decisions at the end of life.98
But the public belief that doctors would be rationing life-sustaining medical care was
enough to doom adoption of the provision. 9 9
89. Id. at 11.
90. Michelle Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy Over High-Dose Chemotherapy with
Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant For Breast Cancer, 20 HEALTH AFF. 101, 102 (2001).
91. See id. at 101 (discussing how insurers were forced to provide coverage).
92. Id. at 101-02; see generally Dan T. Vogl & Edward A. Stadtmauer, High-dose Chemotherapy and
Autologous Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplantation for Metastatic Breast Cancer. A Therapy Whose Time
Has Passed, 37 BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 985 (2006) (concluding that "time of high-dose therapy
and autologous stem cell transplant for breast cancer has passed").
93. Robert Steinbrook, Saying No Isn't NICE, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1977, 1977 (2008).
94. Developing NICE Clinical Guidelines, NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH AND CLINICAL EXCELLENCE (Feb.
19, 2010), www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/howwework/developingniceclinicalguidelines/developing_nice-clinical
guidelinesjsp.
95. Sarah Boseley, NICE to Lose Powers to Decide on New Drugs, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 29, 2010,
available at www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/oct/29/nice-to-lose-new-drug-power.
96. Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, False 'Death Panels ' Rumor Has Some Familiar Roots, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2009, at Al.
97. Id.
98. America's Affordable Health Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 11Ith Cong. § 1233 (2009) (as
introduced).
99. Not only was the provision stripped from the Affordable Care Act, it also failed to be adopted when
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services tried to use the rule-making process to revive the provision.
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VI. COST CONTAINMENT THAT CAN WORK
If public, transparent processes face daunting political obstacles, where do we go
from here? First, we have to consider the pitfalls of non-transparent processes. As Fleck
has observed, hidden, decentralized processes for rationing decisions invite the potential
for arbitrary decisions that reflect personal biases.10 0 There are important moral and
social reasons for transparency and broad public input.
Still, the risk of arbitrary decision making from non-transparent processes may not
be too great, and there may be effective ways to protect against the risk. As to the
severity of the risk, there is good reason to be concerned. Disparities in access to health
care already exist on the basis of race and sex. 10 1 If physicians provide fewer services,
we might expect disfavored persons to suffer a disproportionate share of the diminution.
On the other hand, a study that looked at this question is reassuring. When a nursing
shortage required hospitals in Boston to close intensive care beds and intensive care had
to be rationed more strictly, researchers studied the impact of the rationing on patient
health. 102 They neither found harm to the average patient, nor evidence that physicians
disfavored hopelessly ill patients or older patients.103 In addition, safeguards can be
employed to discover and correct unfair rationing practices. As indicated by the
experience of the VA Health Care system and other model health care systems, good
quality health care entails monitoring of physician practices to identify doctors who
provide inappropriate care. 104
If we want to choose among non-transparent processes for rationing health care,
perhaps the most useful method would be to adopt economic incentives that drive doctors
and other providers toward more cost-effective care. By doing so, we can satisfy the need
for a workable rationing process and at the same time reduce the need to ration health
care. Because fee-for-service reimbursement is a major factor in generating the provision
of unnecessary care and pushing health care costs ever higher, 10 5 eliminating fee-for-
service compensation should markedly reduce the cost pressures that make rationing
necessary.
What would take the place of fee-for-service reimbursement? Physicians should earn
their compensation solely through salary or capitation fees for the patients they serve. 0 6
Similarly, hospitals should earn their compensation solely through capitation fees.
Robert Pear, A Reversalfor Medicare on Planning for Life's End, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2011, at A15.
100. Fleck, supra note 41, at 1616.
101. See generally Alix Weisfeld & Robert L. Perlman, Disparities and Discrimination in Health Care, 48
PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. S1 (2005) (examining racial disparities in healthcare).
102. Daniel E. Singer et al., Rationing Intensive Care-Physician Responses to a Resource Shortage, 309
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1155, 1158-59 (1983).
103. Id.
104. See Jonathan B. Perlin et al., The Veterans Health Administration: Quality, Value, Accountability, and
Information as Transforming Strategies for Patient-Centered Care, 10 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 828, 831 (2004)
(discussing the VA's success in employing "an audit program to assess clinical performance"); David
Leonhardt, Making Health Care Better, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 2009, at MM31 (examining efforts to improve
healthcare).
105. See supra text accompanying note 38.
106. With capitation, physicians would receive a fixed amount of compensation per patient. For example, a
physician might assume responsibility for the care of 500 patients and receive $200 per patient, for total
compensation of $100,000. Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 158-59.
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Other financial incentives to provide unnecessary care also should be eliminated.
For example, when physicians invest in medical laboratories or other health care
facilities, they are much more likely to refer patients for services at the facilities. 107 Thus,
to the extent that federal law still permits physician investment in health care facilities-
as with physician-hospital joint ventures 10 8-the law should be changed to prohibit such
investments.1 09 Salaried and capitated physicians can be well-compensated-indeed,
primary care physicians should earn more income than they currently receive-but they
should not be compensated based on the amount of health care they deliver. To reinforce
the incentives for lower-cost, higher-quality care, salaries or capitation fees for
physicians and hospitals can be supplemented by bonuses for higher-quality care.
From a Tragic Choices perspective, there is an important advantage of salary over
capitation when choosing a reimbursement method for physicians. Recall the Calabresi
and Bobbitt distinction between first-order and second-order rationing decisions.1 10 Since
the setting of capitation rates entails a determination of how much money to spend on
patient care, it clearly represents a first-order rationing decision.1 11 Setting physician
salaries also entails a rationing decision-since it constitutes a decision about how much
money to allocate for physician care-but it is a less direct form of rationing and
therefore less likely to provoke public controversy. 112
As mentioned, eliminating financial incentives for physicians and hospitals to
provide unnecessary care will be valuable not only for reducing the need for rationing. 113
It also will serve the important purpose of providing a non-transparent process for the
second-order rationing decisions as to how health care resources will be allocated among
the patients who might receive care. When physicians and hospitals no longer have
incentives to provide more care, they will naturally tend toward providing less care.114
As they reduce their level of care, they automatically will make allocation decisions
among different patients, and they will do so in a non-transparent way.
In this regard, it is important to remember that physicians and hospitals must always
107. Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, Evidence on Complex Structures ofPhysician Joint Ventures, 9 YALE
J. ON REG. 489, 492-93 (1992).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(3) (2006).
109. Another incentive for higher-cost, lower-quality care came from the practice of oncologists delivering
cancer chemotherapy in their offices and charging substantial premiums over their acquisition costs for the
drugs. Alex Berenson, Incentives Limit Any Savings in Treating Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2007, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/12/business/12cancerpay.html. Although insurers stopped allowing the
substantial premiums, oncologists found other ways to maintain spending on cancer care. Id. For example, fee-
for-service reimbursement encouraged them to recommend chemotherapy to more patients and also to install
imaging machines in their offices to perform expensive diagnostic scans. Id.
110. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 52, at 18-20 (examining first-order and second-order rationing
decisions).
1 11. Id
112. Id.
113. See supra text accompanying note 105.
114. In fact, physicians decide whether to treat a patient or not and how to treat a patient. It is the physician,
for example, who decides whether to admit a patient to a hospital. However, it still is important to remove
financial incentives for hospitals to provide more care. Hospital administrators can exert pressures on
physicians to admit more or fewer patients (e.g., by giving preferential treatment to physicians who practice in
ways that the hospital likes), so it is important to align physician and hospital financial incentives. HALL ET AL.,
supra note 73, at 1113.
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make allocation decisions. Whether they are spending 17% of GDP or 12% of GDP on
health care, health care professionals have to establish cut-offs for their provision of care.
To put it another way, physicians practice under finite time limits and hospitals under
finite space limits, so they are always allocating their time and space among the different
patients for whom they could provide care.
Of course, with salary and capitation, physicians and hospitals might provide too
little care instead of too much care. 115 That problem can be addressed by the same
monitoring of practices needed to protect against arbitrary decision making. The bonuses
for higher-quality care also would counteract the tendency to provide too little care.
Liability for medical malpractice should reinforce monitoring and bonuses, as well as
deter substandard care. Empirical studies suggest that these safeguards can adequately
protect against the risks of too little care. Research on the impact of HMOs and other
managed care plans generally has found that those plans provide the same quality of care
as traditional, fee-for-service plans.116
The switch to salaries and capitation fees has other implications. Salaries require
physicians to be employed by a health care organization, and capitation fees require large
patient pools to ensure that physicians and hospitals have enough low-cost patients over
which they can spread the expenses of caring for high-cost patients.117 Accordingly,
changing physician and hospital reimbursement will encourage physicians and hospitals
to participate in accountable care organizationsI1 8 or other large health-care networks.
While some have raised concerns about the antitrust implications of large health care
networks, 1' 9 physicians generally provide better care when they practice with
colleagues, 120 and they are in a better position to coordinate care for patients who have
multiple medical problems.
VII. CONCLUSION
As health care costs continue to rise, the need for effective cost containment
measures will become even greater. From a moral standpoint, policy experts are correct
to recommend public, transparent processes for implementing rationing decisions.
However, life-and-death decisions do not lend themselves to satisfactory resolution when
115. Orentlicher, supra note 6.
116. HALL ET AL., supra note 73, at 1030-3 1. The empirical evidence suggests that poor and chronically ill
patients may not fare as well under managed care, so the monitoring of physician practices would be important
to protect the needs of those patients. Id.
117. Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 162-64.
118. Accountable care organizations are entities like the Mayo Clinic or an HMO in which physicians,
other health care professionals, and hospitals form provider networks to deliver care in a comprehensive,
coordinated fashion. Under the Affordable Care Act, financial incentives will be provided to encourage the
formation of accountable care organizations. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148
§§ 2706, 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 325,395 (2010); Elliott Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving
Forward in Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. w219, w220-22 (2009).
119. Barak D. Richman & Kevin A. Schulman, A Cautious Path Forward on Accountable Care
Organizations, 305 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 602, 602-03 (2011).
120. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Ketcham et al., Physician Practice Size and Variations in Treatment and
Outcomes: Evidence from Medicare Patients with AM7, 26 HEALTH AFF. 195, 195 (2007) (finding that patients
with heart attacks did better when their physicians practiced in a group rather than alone).
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pursued openly.
Social constraints push us toward implicit rationing processes. These processes can
draw an appropriate balance between moral and social considerations so long as adequate
safeguards are employed to detect and correct unfair rationing decisions. By changing
reimbursement from fee-for-service to salary and capitation, we not only can have an
effective non-transparent process for rationing, we also can reduce the need to ration
health care.

